by Joe Parish

By Joe Parish

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge everyone who offered encouragement, advice and patience in helping me get this project finished. In particular, all those who agreed to and took part in the research interviews. The discussion was insightful and fully appreciated, I would not have been able to complete the project without you. Also, to Maria Kyriakidou whose word of advice and knowledge helped me get and keep this project on the right tracks.

ABSTRACT

The introduction of digital media and social media platforms has reconstructed the ways in which conflicts are reported in news coverage. There is no clearer example of this than the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine over the contested Gaza Strip. Current literature on this topic has focused on the influence of traditional news outlets, particular legacy news organisations such as CNN, The BBC and The New York Times. Recently more attention has been devoted to social media’s role in conflict reporting. However, there remains a literature gap on coverage on social media is impacting audiences experience and understandings of the topic. This study aims to uncover how perceptions of the Israel-Palestine conflict have been shaped by social media coverage, what issues are present in this coverage and how they are being dealt with. As audience experience is central to this, research consisted of twelve in person interviews. The findings show that there is an abundance of issues present in social media news coverage of Israel-Palestine. Of which, audiences are often unaware of or making minimal attempts to rectify. Such coverage is influencing audiences’ perceptions of social media news, their access to conflict coverage and their understandings of the Israel-Palestine conflict. This study shows a clear need for further research into these areas and builds on current understandings surrounding the influence of social media and this conflict.

1.Introduction

This MA dissertation study aims to assess the news coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict on social media. This will be uncovered through assessing how audiences using social media understand the conflict, how they are dealing with issues in coverage such as disinformation and also, how they engage or are changing their habits to engage with news sources online. In doing so, this study also attempts to bring to light further issues within the news coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict on social media, the audience experience and awareness of these issues. Through successful research and analysis this study will also further knowledge on this particular subject, filling a gap which current exists in scholarly writing, and help encourage further thought and assessment of potential solutions for the issues discussed.

The content of this study will focus on coverage post to social media platforms. These include, Instagram, X (formerly Twitter), Facebook and TikTok among others. It will also consider discussion relating to online news coverage on websites, applications and forums. And additionally, traditional media and legacy news organisations, in particular, in relation to existing literature. While in terms of what parts of users understanding we are assessing. This study seeks to better understanding how interpretations and ideas of the Israel-Palestine conflict vary in relation to individuals’ news consumption habits on social media. This includes how often they use social media, where on social media they are consuming their news, their level of trust in such coverage and if they are taking any steps when consuming news to deal with issues in coverage.

These issues include but are not limited to, Disinformation, Misinformation, Cyberbalkanization, Audience Conflict and Graphic Content. This study will also consider how social media has facilitated an expansion of these issues and what this may mean for the future of coverage posted to such sites. Also, of significance, how these issues can influence perceptions of the conflict, shape global awareness and in some cases have implications which directly affect the conflict.

The research method I have chosen to undertake to best achieve these research aims is interviews. This is because as this work revolves around audience experiences on social media and this methodology grants me the best chances to access and assess these. Twelve individuals from various backgrounds, professions and ages were interviewed either in-person or over the phone during a period of two weeks, in June of 2024. Individuals were presented with three examples of news coverage on social media, asked to discuss these and then also asked a subsequent twenty-two questions into their experiences of coverage on social media. These responses were then analysed through the lens of thematic content analysis.

In terms of essay structure this work will follow a simple, accessible and logical flow. Firstly, the section following this will be a literature review of the current writing on this topic. This will consider literature relating to news coverage of Israel- Palestine, social media and coverage of the war, disinformation and social media news and finally, the news audiences of Gaza. The subsequent section will discuss the methodology used in researching this project, including key research questions, a breakdown of the method, sample strategy and empirical material, with a final paragraph on limitations and reflections. The bulk of this essay will then be made up by the findings and discussion section. Here, responses from interview questions will be analysed thematically, highlighting common themes in audience experience of news reporting of Israel-Palestine on social media, as well as trends in social media news consumption habits and discussion of issues present in coverage on social media. The final section of this essay will focus on concluding thoughts as a result of this analysis and further discussion. Ultimately, I believe my research and subsequent analysis has highlighted several concerning trends in how social media news coverage of Israel-Palestine is influencing audiences’ perceptions of the conflict, as well as a need for the furthering of knowledge into the issues present in such coverage and how audiences are to deal with such issues. Current scholarly writing into social media news coverage has not focused so specifically on this shaping of perceptions and issues, but instead highlighted bias in traditional media and alternatively, the impact social media coverage can have on the conflict.

2.1 Introduction

2- Literature Review

Coverage of the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine in the Gaza Strip has dominated news outlets on social media during the latter half of 2023. This literature review aims to discuss the current academic writing of relevance to this topic. To achieve this, it will be broken down into several sections. Firstly, writing which has addressed news coverage of Israel-Palestine, this includes traditional news outlets and structures of coverage. Further, writing which has specifically addresses coverage of the Gaza conflict on Social Media, including how this medium has affected coverage and can even influence the conflict. This issue of disinformation present in social media news, of which scholarly attention has been numerous. Finally, writing which has addressed the news audiences of the aforementioned coverage, who are vital components of this study.

2.2 News About Gaza

The ongoing conflict over the contested Gaza Strip has received unprecedented amounts of news coverage. When I decided to undertake this study almost over a year ago, I by no means believed this topic would still be so relevant and part of the daily news cycle. Coverage of the conflict has spread internationally, across all forms of media, captivating individuals’ attention across the globe. Mike Berry, writing in 2017, expressed his belief that this unprecedented coverage is due to several factors. Those being, the involvement of elite geopolitical actors, a consistent stream of images of bloodshed and the significance of the conflict area as a holy site for three major religions (Berry 2017). Although undeniably vast, it’s hard to a place a number or scale on the amount of news publicised about this conflict. Work by Cavari and Yarchi set the number of US articles published on the conflict in 2017 as 269 a month (Cavari and Yarchi 2017). This number will only have grown. Further, where this coverage is now coming from can be vital in shaping perceptions of the conflict. Both traditional and modern media play crucial roles in reshaping narratives as “the media takes an active part in the conflict” (Zanuddin and Almahallawi 2017, p682). This

idea of coverage impacting perceptions has run throughout scholarly writing. Most notably in discussion of news reporting bias.

A major argument established in scholarly writing on coverage of the conflict is that news organisations, in both traditional and new media, are shaping coverage to represent their own biases and agendas. The majority of this academic writing has opted to use qualitative analysis method. Of notable popularity is Critical Discourse Analysis, laid out by Fairclough in 1995 (Fairclough 1995). This methodology has been utilised on a widespread scale to highlight western media biases. By undertaking a critical discourse analysis, the work of Laelasari (2023), found that differing headlines and presentation styles were used across US media outlets to emphasis or downplay certain aspects of the conflict (Lealasari 2023). While following the same methodology, work by Amer M also found the US news outlet, The New York Times, to have been deploying framing tactics to de-emphasis certain parts of the conflict, including Israel’s responsibility towards causality (Amer 2022). In line with this, critical discourse analysis of coverage has led both Wang (2017) and Iran, Aqeel and Hussain (2024) to address media bias in BBC reporting of Israel-Palestine, in which framing, Islamophobia and stereotypes were prevalent (Wang 2017) (Iran, Aqeel and Hussain 2024). The BBC in particular has been the centre of “numerous scholarly papers on media bias in coverage of Israel-Palestinian conflict” (McTigue 2011, p.76). This sentiment of bias in western media reporting has featured heavily in academic writing, with David Edwards describing it as a “sustained idea” (Edwards 2018, p.59) that the truth is often hidden, buried or obfuscated from the public by such outlets. Whilst Al-Jazeera has claimed that such conflict reporting is legitimising Israeli war crimes and only telling one side of the story (Al-Jazeera 2023). Those not following Fairclough’s 1995 method of Critical Discourse Analysis, have commonly opted to follow the alternate working of Van Dijk. This model of CDA aims to highlight strategies of emphasizing and de-emphasising to frame coverage (Van Dijk 2011). Work on this method has led to similar academic conclusions. Focus on these emphasising and de-emphasising tactics has highlighted western media as depicting Palestinians as militants, terrorists or as a threat. Whilst Israeli actions are conversely framed as defensive and justified (Kareem and Hajm 2024). Whilst work by Fikri (2024) deployed the methodology laid out by Van Dijk to assess the Microstructure (local meanings, sentence structure and rhetoric), Superstructure (content of coverage) and Macrostructure (global meanings and social context) of Fox news coverage of the conflict. This work also found that coverage was framed to align with the reporting organisations own goals. In this case coverage was aimed to play on global insecurity whilst engaging readers and encouraging debate (Fikri 2024). Finally, on Van Dijk’s model, work by Almustafa (2024) made use of the social-cognitive aspects of this model to analyse 25 articles from 10 international news outlets. Findings here showed that global media outlets portrayed Israel positively and Palestinians negatively, with the later often being labelled as terrorists or extremists (Almustafa 2024), echoing similar findings by Kareem and Hajm (Kareem and Hajm 2024). However, bias in reporting of the coverage has not been limited to certain sides of the conflict or reporting organisations.

Broader academic writing into biases in coverage of the conflict has shown that issues of news representation and framing are present across both sides of the conflict, in international news organisations and on multiple mediums. Recent Studies by Kandil (2009) and Panayotova and Rizova (2021) have determined that news networks across both the Western and Middle-Eastern regions have all represented and framed conflict coverage in line with their own biases and specific strategies (Kandil 2009) (Panayotova and Rizova 2021). This bias is therefore clearly not limited to western media. Discussion has also considered how Middle-eastern media outlets have highlighted Palestinian perspectives and often “tended to view Palestinians as victims and Israelis as aggressors” (Shamy and Auter 2013, p.764). Al-Jazeera, with its 430million viewership, has specifically been criticised for presenting bias towards Palestinian narratives, often with clear potential for shaping the perceptions of viewers (Amaireh 2024).

Existing literature on the news coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict has thus highlighted issues relating to varying emphasis, framing and bias across all news outlets. Western media has focused on Israeli disengagement, perceived Palestinian terrorism and Israeli casualties. Whilst Middle-Eastern media coverage has centred

around Israel as the aggressor and highlighting the Palestinian perspective. This varying coverage can distort users’ perspective stories, cause potential harm and emotional distress. There is a need for greater awareness by audiences of how such biases affect the coverage they see (Ozohu-Suleiman 2012). My study into such issues aims to raise awareness among audiences and further knowledge on potential solutions. The research carried out for this work will also include discussion of images and videos attached to coverage on social media. This is because existing work on the news of Gaza on social media, in particular that of Bratner and Lobinger (2011), has stressed the importance of image choice in coverage. This media is important as framing through visuals can elicit strong emotional and value-based concerns among audience members perceptions of the news (Bratner and Lobinger 2011). With coverage of Israel-Palestine specifically, such imagery often involves scenes of violence and injury, something which is only becoming increasing common and graphic online (Jungblut and Zakareviciute 2018). Such imagery of the Gaza conflict has also been shown to be able to influence public opinion (Dobernig and Lobinger 2016).

Central to our study is what this shaping of coverage by media organisations and news publishers has done to impact coverage on social media. To best assess this, we also need to consider existing literature relating specifically to coverage on social media. This work will also include the role social media can play in influencing the conflict.

2.3 Social Media and Coverage of the Conflict

Social Media has become a major part of our daily lives. This has slingshot these platforms and the content on them to the forefront of international information dissemination. They now make up a significant part of how we receive our news of current global events, interact with debates surrounding current topics and perceive the world outside our immediate surroundings. Current writing has reflected this influence. Work by Will Ward (2009) into the impact of social media on the Gaza conflict, determined these networks to be at the forefront of politics in the Middle east (Ward 2009). As these platforms are able to provide diverse audiences with newinformation and perspectives, shaping public opinion (Evans 2016). The impact of these developments has shaped coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict on social media.

Social media has revolutionised how the conflict has been covered. These platforms grant audiences instantaneous access to information, on a worldwide scale, are devoid of structure barriers applicable to traditional media and draw in vast public attention (Zahoor and Sadiq 2021). Such changes have also seen a significant growth in citizen journalism of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Facilitated by sites introducing the ability for everyone to record and publish news video content (Chouliaraki 2015). This increased accessibility to disseminate news has accelerated and expanded the reach of news coverage about the conflict. With social media sharing possessing the influence to trigger significant public responses and shaping of narratives (Maharani 2024). This additional ability to shape the narrative, has meant social media is increasingly becoming utilised to control conflict perceptions and diplomacy efforts. One study, by Celik and Boz at the university of Ankara, found that twitter was being increasingly used by Palestinian officials and leveraged “not merely as an information tool but as a strategic medium” (Celik and Boz 2024, p.2). This increased influence has led further writing to highlight the role social media can play in the Israel- Palestine conflict.

Current writing has included how social media can influence public support and increase international awareness of causes. In doing so, social media can influence conflict intensity (Zeitzoff 2016). Existing literature has drawn on recent examples to illustrate this point. This includes the Palestinian protests at the Al-Asqa Mosque Compound. This movement first started on Instagram, here mass support was achieved from the sharing of iconic imagery and language, this was a key motivator for protestors and quickly the platform mobilised crowds (Abushbak and Majeed 2002). Writing has also touched on how social media has influenced the conflict through granting Palestinians a voice. Work by Monshipouri and Prompichai has argued that social media has facilitated a new awareness among Palestinians that digital political activism can bring about real tangible change (Monshipouri and Prompichai 2018). While Garfias has explained that this political activism has often come in the form of increased citizen journalism from young Palestinians (Garfias 2024). This personal coverage has been heavily relied on to document Israeli attacks on Gaza, in doing so, influencing how the attacks were covered on mainstream media (Alakklouk and Gulnar 2023). Such coverage has made social media instrumental in advancing Palestinian unity and support. Although, this new importance granted to social media hasn’t all be beneficial to platforms and the coverage on them. As explained by Byman (2021) these social media platforms are now routinely being manipulated by Middle-Eastern governments, to spread propaganda and shape narratives, often during conflict (Byman 2021). Further, this has in some cases meant social networking sites, such as Instagram, often becoming hotbeds for conflict between various activist and individuals (Supriyanto and Pratiwi 2002). As the war between Israel-Palestine continues, the conflict has been increasingly played out on social media. This can be seen as legacy media outlets present conflicting representation, government officials take to sites in attempts to control narrative and grassroots organisations work to mobilize crowds and apply pressure. All of this has meant they there is a clear digital dimension to the Israel-Palestine conflict, with social media playing a significant role (Klajnowska 2022). Therefore, understanding social media roles, and the coverage on these platforms, is vital when attempting to understanding this conflict.

This coverage, however, has not be devoid of issues. Such issues have not gone unnoticed, with legacy media organisations The Associated Press and Al-Jazeera both writing long form articles in the last year on the misinformation and misrepresentations of conflict coverage present on social media (Associated Press 2023) (Al-Jazeera 2023). Scholarly writing here has tended to focus on the framing of conflict news on social media. With studies by both Waiske (2013) and Oguejiofor (2023) highlighting how actors involved all along the social media news chain make decisions which influence the attention granted to and perspective of certain stories relating to Israel-Palestine (Waiske 2013) (Oguejiofor 2023). The issue which has reached the most scholarly attention, is that of Disinformation present in social media coverage of Israel-Palestine.

2.4 Disinformation and Social Media News

Firstly, one clear area of writing on this topic has focused on how social media sites allow for and even facilitate disinformation. Work by Shu and Wang has explained how this is due to social media sites providing low barriers to disseminate news, with the openness and anonymity afforded by such platforms only making sharing more convenient (Shu and Wang 2023). In recent cases, these low barriers have meant that large proportions of the fake news of Israel-Palestine on social media is being created by AI (Lakhani 2023). While Horner and Galletta has determined that the tools provided by social media, that being the platforms to create and distribute fake news, have been used to exacerbate an already present problem with disinformation and now provided a foundation for disinformation and extremism to grow (Horner and Galletta 2022). But what is universally agreed upon by scholarly writing on this topic is that social media has considerable influence on global news flows and have liberalised the processes involved in gathering and disseminating news (Ozuru and Ekeanyanwu 2013). This has meant that social media sites have become a vital tool for news outlets and audiences. Studies by Giansiaracusa, Antino and Moravec have shown that 60% of adults consume news on social media, while among US citizens 20% actively turn to social media to consume all their political and election news (Giansiaracusa 2021) (Antino and Moravec 2019).

Subsequently, social media news coverage is now rife with disinformation. This issue is only compounded when we consider current scholarly writing further. Work by Vosoughi and Roy has found that this fake news content spreads across social media faster than true news coverage, while researchers at the PEW research centre have determined that over 50% of American’s believe fake news to be a serious issue, more than climate change, racism or terrorism (Vosoughi and Roy 2018) (Mitchell et al 2019). This fake news spreads quickly and has the potential for extremely negative impacts for individuals and societies. In particular, the potential for becoming trapped in an echo chamber of fake news or extremism is highly likely on social media, here “users continue to share and consume the same information” regardless of its reliability or accuracy (Shu et al 2017, p24). In terms of audience propensity to dealwith the abundance of fake news, existing literature is limited. A recent study by Selnes has determined that teenagers face serious difficulties when attempting to determine digital news credibility (Selnes 2023). However, further investigation and discussion is required on this topic. A knowledge gap this study hopes to help by uncovering audience experience and awareness of issues with Israel-Palestine coverage, such as disinformation.

2.5 News Audiences of Gaza

The final section of this literature review will consider the news audiences of Gaza. In particular who makes up this audience, how they engage with content and the potential risks of doing so. Current writing has highlighted the idea that audiences of news on social media actively engage with coverage. Their behaviours can best be understood as “acts of producing content as well as participating” (Barnes 2016, p.179). Work by Alsubari and Alhiba which analysed three million comments left under social media coverage of Israel-Palestine, showed how audiences are emotionally engaging with content, exhibiting both sentiment and sympathy (Alsubari and Alhiba 2024). These audiences, actively and emotionally engaging with social media coverage, risk exposure to graphic and harmful content.

Israel-Palestine coverage on social media has been a hotbed for graphic, violent and shocking content. These networks have helped facilitate such coverage as social networks have normalised the exchange and consumption of violent imagery (Nicklin and Swain 2020), while comments sections are often rife with “examples of online vitriol” (Clucas 2020, p.48). This can have damaging effects on audiences. Work by Thompson has highlighted how viewing real world footage of shootings and bombings, a regular feature of Israel-Palestine coverage, can initiate a cycle of distress and worry (Thompson 2019). While comment sections are often abusive (Green 2002) with exchanges featuring malicious intentions to cause offense and menace (De La Vega and Ng 2018). Further, audiences can be harmed by the way in which coverage on social media is framed. Work by Lynch, McGoldrick and Heathers (2015) how shown how varying frameworks of conflict coverage greatly impact audiences’ emotional reaction and engagement (Lynch et al 2015). This emotional damage can reaction and engagement (Lynch et al 2015). This emotional damage can also snowball into a reduction in trust and assumed credibility of coverage (Alasharani 2021). As well as emotional harm, audiences consuming news of Israel-Palestine on social media also risk ideological isolation. Scholarly writing on this topic has greatly picked up since Cass Sunstein defined the term Cyberbalkanization in 2008. This term refers to the negative idea that individuals online can group into sections that relate solely to their own points of view (Sunstein 2008). The potential for this has only been worsened by online algorithms which influence the information users see based on preferences (Mardell 2017) and the increasing prominence of confirmation bias on social media. This bias makes social media users more likely to believe and spread articles that align with their own personal beliefs (Antino and Moravec 2019). This bias, combined with exposure to graphic content on social media, can influence how audiences view the conflict.

            Audience studies by Mike Berry and Greg Philo in More Bad News for Israel (2011) also highlighted how vulnerable audiences’ perceptions and emotions are to changes in news framing. Analysis stemming from focus groups and questionnaires produced several examples, including, how changes in TV reporting which focused on Israeli casualties greatly influenced imagery audiences associated with the conflict and its victims (Philo and Berry 2011, p285). They also found those receiving their news from a limited variety of sources had warped perspectives of conflict origins and motives (Philo and Berry 2011, p269).

2.6 Conclusion

In total, the news coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict has drawn significant scholarly attention. Writing focused on the importance of clarity and accuracy in news reporting, with frequent studies regularly showing bias in conflict reporting relevant to news outlets and platforms ideologies and motives. Although the majority of writing has focused on traditional news outlets, there has been a shift in recent research to focus more on social media. These works have shown coverage on such platforms contain numerous issues, chief of which among those is disinformation. These works have also highlighted how these issues have and can impact audiences’ emotions and perceptions. My study looks to extend this established body of writing into social media coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Adding further knowledge by uncovering audience’s awareness and experience of the issues with coverage highlighted by previous literature.

3- Methodology

3.1 Introduction

Since the dawn of Web2.0 the internet has played host to the largest store of information on current world events. This information reaches almost 5.5billion people globally. The most current, relevant or ‘trending’ of this news coverage exists on social media networking sites such as X (formerly twitter), Instagram and Facebook. This study focuses on online news content, specifically coverage and discussion on social media. In most cases the content discussed will have been created by, posted to or shared on behalf of organisations and individuals operating on social media networking sites. This study will also consider other related online sources of news, and any resultant information or surrounding discussion of online news content. Through investigation and analysis of such coverage this study aims to uncover the multitude and extent of issues present within online, social media-based news coverage. The ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine over the contested Gaza strip has dominated news discourse since fighting reignited on the 7^th of October 2023, coverage has been littered with issues and so this study will focus specifically on news coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict. I believe my aims for discussion and highlighting of issues present in online coverage of Israel-Palestine will be best achieved through a focus on audience experience of news online and on social media, audience awareness of the above-mentioned issues and audience’s opinions towards potential harm to coverage and prevention. The issues referred to here are the same as those previously discussed throughout this article, Dis and Misinformation, Framing, Cyberbalkanization, Graphic Content and Audience Conflict.

            To best achieve these aims, through the scope of audience experience and awareness, I will be using interviews and subsequently analysing them thematically. Interviews will cover areas mentioned so far throughout this project, they include but are not limited to social media usage habits, online news consumption, issues present in social media news content and steps for prevention.

            The research questions for this project are

• How are audiences consuming news of the Israel-Palestine Conflict on Social Media?
  • How is the conflict being understood by social media audiences?
  • How are they dealing with disinformation?
  • What ways do they engage with sources? 

These questions function to expand understanding of social media news consumption habits. To assess audience awareness of the issues discussed throughout and potentially, their experience of them and in doing so uncovering the prevalence of these issues and opening discussion for any potential steps to tackle them.

3.2 The Method

As mentioned above, for this work I selected to use interviews. Interviews have been a key primary data source for countless articles focused on media studies. They grant researchers access to audiences lives and perceptions of experiences important to them (Belk, Fischer and Locander 1994). In doing so, allowing researchers the insight as to how audiences members worldview is shaped and understood (McCracken 1998).  Successful interviews, most likely to yield the best primary data, need to follow an interactive, flexible nature but remained focused on key research questions (Arsel 2017). These interviews were private, held either in person or over the phone on a one-to-one basis and comprising of three visual examples presented initially and then twenty subsequent questions. In total twelve interviews were held with respondents varying in age, social media usage and occupation. All participants details were anonymised. Data collected from these interviews has been presented in the Findings and Discussion section of this project, presented as a thematic content analysis.

            There are several clear advantages associated with choosing interviews as the method of investigation when attempting to address the research aims in question. Firstly, as a qualitative method, they “imply a concentration on processes of meaning and understanding” (Philo and Berry 2006, p280) something which is vital when attempting to better understand audiences experience and awareness of issues. Further advantages of interviews include the opportunity to judge how questions are being understood, the chance to discuss follow-up issues and the potential to uncover news knowledge through further discussion.

            Interviews were designed and carried out with the aim of sparking conversation and further discussion with participants. I wanted to use the time as an opportunity to gain insight into how audiences on social media had experienced the issues being discussed, this meant attempting to uncover how they felt towards these issues, there awareness and knowledge surrounding them. As argued by Rowley (2012) in Conducting Research Interviews, when the research objectives “centre on understanding experiences, opinions, attitudes, values and processes” (Rowley 2012, p.226) interviews are the best choice of method. However, the way in which interviews are conducted is still vital in achieving your desired outcomes. As mentioned above my aims involved conversational questions which elicited sharing of experiences and opinions. To achieve this, I firstly focused on making participants feel comfortable through my use of transparency. This meant giving clear and concise explanations to the participants of what the interview involved in terms of question length, timing and that there are no inherently right or wrong answers when discussing opinions and experiences. I also hoped the decision to anonymise all interviews would help with participants openness. Success would be evident by the development of rapport between interviewer and interviewee. Rapport here being defined by Likert (1947) as “a spirit of co-operation and respect between interviewer and respondent” (Likert 1947). If an interviewer is too structured then rapport will be reduced, but with openness and conversational approaches, successful rapport development can nudge participants towards “total involvement” (Hyman 1954).

Three initial examples were presented to participants (See Appendix). The choice to present these first granted me the opportunity to assess how respondents typically react to and experience online news content and helped to narrow down discussion of what is potentially an extensively broad topic, before structured questioning begun. The first, a screenshot from social media site X (formerly twitter) highlighted issues of fake news, the second a BBC post pulled from Facebook showed framing and audience conflict issues while the third and final a #alleyesonrafah post from Instagram looked to uncover participants social media activity and habits. These examples them led into a set of 22 questions which were structured thematically to discuss social media habits, opinions of and trust in online news, fake news, framing, graphic content and emotional impacts of, audience debate and interactions surrounding news, cyberbalkanization and future solutions. Throughout the interviews I attempted, wherever possible, to present participants with open questions, often with the potential for further elaboration or follow-up questions. These are questions which cannot be answered with a static response such as ‘yes’ or ‘no’, I also removed all quantitative scale response options. These open-ended questions as discussed by Stanley Page (1951) in chapter three of Art of Asking Questions are uninfluenced questions which work exceedingly well in eliciting a wide variety of responses and can be used to solicit suggestions, evaluate arguments and explore participants knowledge and memory (Page 1951). The use of such questions gave me the best chance of achieving my aims as they encourage conversation which would most productively uncover audience experience of issues, grant me the opportunity to assess awareness and further judge the impact of issues on participants.

            Although I had an established script with a set number of questions, as interviews progressed, I did not ask all participants questions in the same order with exactly the same chances for follow up questions or requests to elaborate further. The answers from participants and conversation developed between interviewer and respondent shaped, to a certain extent, the interview format. For example, some individuals confessed they took no steps to verify news sources on social media, warranting no follow up, while a certain proportion answered that they did and thus were asked to elaborate further.  When conducting these interviews, I therefore did not totally prescribe to following the methodology of standardised interviewing. This is because I believed that doing so would not yield the best results possible. Issues with entirely standardised interviews have been discussed throughout scholarly work, Paul Beatty has argued that they are often “inherently riddled with interviewer-respondent communication problem” (Beatty 1995, p147). As I believed that one of the aspects central to achieving my research aims was clear and productive communication between interviewer-respondent I was particularly keen to avoid this particular potential problem. In comparison, non-standardised interviews and question choices geared towards conversation often provide researchers with the best chance of yielding valid information (Mishler 1986) and it has even been argued that they improve the quality of participants responses and ability to express opinions (Briggs 1986).

            However, when considering the limitations of my chosen method I do have to mention the loss of the usual advantages associated with standardised interviewing. Mainly that working from a rigorously set script would have ensured a level of uniformity and fairness when asking questions. Further standardised interviewing does offer another protective layer in making sure the interviewer does not divulge their own personal beliefs and opinions, in doing so influencing the answers of the respondent (Sidlecki 2022). In reflection, the method of interviewing could also be hampered by poor question selection. This reliance on proficient question choice is in itself limiting. The work of Fowler and Mangione discusses this reliance and argues that successful interview practice is heavily dependent on question selection and that the chosen questions must be clearly presented and universally understood (Fowler and Mangione 1990).

3.3 Sampling Strategy

Interviews were held privately on a one-to-one basis, either in person or on the phone. Respondents varied in terms of ages, occupations and their social media usage habits. As agreed upon before beginning the interview process, all participants’ personal information has been anonymised, however a general profile of those who participated is available in the appendix. Having known I wanted to research this particular project since October 2023 I have had plenty of time to think about how I wanted to source individuals to interview. As time, the conflict and coverage progressed, I became more certain that I wanted to avoid questioning anyone from my immediate social group or anyone who I interact with regularly in the workplace, at university, in my free time or at home. This was because I was already regularly discussing the topic of Israel-Palestine with these individuals, didn’t want my own personal relationships or opinions to influence responses and also with such a divisive and often distressing topic I wanted participants not to feel as though personal ties were affecting their ability to share their true feelings. To achieve this, I decided to follow the approach of asking those I did know or interact with to place me in touch with someone I’m not directly involved with, this ranged from family friends to the partners of work colleagues. In total I was able to conduct twelve interviews over the two-week period of the 7^th-21^st of June 2024.

            Since the outset of this project my sampling plan has always been to create a stratified sample. In this case it would mean matching the age of those in my interview sample with that of the population of users on the top four social media platforms. At the time of writing those sites are Facebook with 3 Billion users, YouTube with 2.5 Billion, Instagram with 2 Billion and TikTok with 1.5 Billion (Dixon 2024). Our strata here, age, will be broken into three groups of 18-38 (Early working population), 39-64 (Late working population) and 65 years and older (Elderly Population). Cross referencing this with data published by Statista (2024) on the age of social media users, to successfully stratify this sample, 60% of respondents would fall between 18-39, with 40% of the age 39-64 and only 1% coming from the elderly population (Statista 2024). Having completed all scheduled interviews, I can now say I have successful stratified my sample as explained above, interviewing 7 participants aged 18-38, 4 between the ages of 39-64 and 1 over the age of 65 years old. I believe constructing my sample this way will create the most accurate representation of audience experience and awareness of the issues present with social media news coverage of Israel-Palestine and in doing so granting me the best opportunity to produce accurate, productive analysis which helps to further knowledge on this topic.

3.4 Analysis of Empirical Material

Questions focused on online news coverage, specifically social media and were shaped to uncover audience experience and awareness of the issues being discussed. As the method was designed with open-ended questions and the aim of conversational responses, the resultant data is vast. Since the outset I planned to group and analyse this data thematically, following the practice of thematic content analysis. Although originally the themes of this were planned and structured in line with the format of the interview and questions chosen, it soon became clear that the themes warranting analysis and discussion were going to be uncovered throughout the process. This is simply because new themes arose, certain issues presented themselves as more prevalent that anticipated whilst others lacked the audience awareness expected of them.

3.5 Limitations and Reflexivity

Having completed the research and turning to consider any potential improvements or changes I would first look at issues relating to the sample size. Although I am pleased with how many interviews I was able to conduct within the timeframe, I would of course have liked the opportunity to have interviewed more individuals, ideally from outside of the UK as arguably this research lacked a global perspective. When considering my own role as researcher I believe I could have made improvements in the question choices, specifically in how some questions explained topics. This is because I soon noticed that certain questions were eliciting a wide variety of sometimes non-related responses, suggesting that in some cases the question was not clearly understood. For example, I know now that I should have done more to explain what I meant by the term “Audience Conflict”, some correctly interpreted it as relating to heated debate, discussion and even trolling surrounding news coverage, while others seemed unsure or undecided as to what the term meant.

Further issues around the assessment of the participants also occurred throughout. Notably I was quite surprised at how apprehensive individuals were to discuss the topic and, in some cases, would not do so without confirming their anonymity. I think this relates more to the divisiveness and politicisation of the Israel-Palestine conflict and less to the study or my chosen method. Related to this I often found that when discussing certain questions participants would quickly become politicised, attempting to take a side of the conflict and share their political views but often fail to discuss news coverage, social media or other relevant topics. Finally on issues faced with participants I must mention that with the majority of respondents it became clear early in the interview process they had clear predetermined either conscious or subconscious beliefs as to what news content exists online and how they should interpret it. In some senses this was very beneficial when discussing certain issues and topics as people were able to give their reasoning towards certain beliefs, however in some cases it seemed to prevent interviewees granting full consideration to certain questions.

            When considering ethical standards, it should be mentioned that those of beneficence, non-maleficence, confidentiality, integrity and autonomy were upheld throughout. I ensured such standards were met through my own personal behaviours, anonymity, data security and informed consent. Informed consent involves giving the participants as much information as possible, so they are able to make an informed decision to participate. Potential participants were informed of the purpose of research, what participation involved, the benefits and risks of taking part, how data would be stored, how personal information would be anonymised and the option to withdraw consent at any moment.

3.6 Conclusion

In conclusion, this work aims to uncover the issues present within social media news coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict. The scope of this study will be based on audience experience and awareness of these issues. As mentioned above I have chosen interviews as my research method, this is because they are the most suitable approach and thus give the greatest opportunity of collecting valid data from which important conclusions can be drawn . These conclusions will be elaborated upon in the following chapter as I begin to analyse interview responses. This analysis will be structured thematically.

4- Findings and Discussion Draft

4.1 Introduction

Twelve individuals with various ages, backgrounds and professions were presented with three examples and twenty-two questions. These were designed to uncover how audiences are consuming news of the Israel-Palestine conflict on social media. This includes understandings of the conflict; issues present and participants’ awareness and experience of this. Questioning followed an open approach with further discussion encouraged throughout. Responses of those interviewed to examples, questions and subsequent discussion fell into four major categories. Firstly, the understanding of the topic which looks at understandings of the Israel-Palestine conflict and coverage on social media, including audience’s social media usage habits. Secondly, dealing with disinformation, including respondents’ preconceptions of conflict coverage, trust in social media coverage and steps taken to handle this issue. Next, source engagement which looks into how audiences are engaging with sources of Israel-Palestine news on social media. This engagement considers emotion, ideological isolation and individual acts of engagement. Finally, longstanding impacts of the coverage which covers individual authority, compassion fatigue and potential next steps to tackle issues. 

4.2 Understanding The Topic

4.2.1 Relevance of Topic

One clear theme arising from discussion with interview participants was the overwhelming relevance of both Israel-Palestine news coverage and the issues being experienced by audiences consuming such coverage. Responses revealed that the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip has dominated news discourse over the previous twelve months, adding further emphasis that this study is both important and necessary. When asked what topics and headlines they believed had dominated news reports over the past year all twelve respondents mentioned Israel-Palestine. Some mentioned specific details of this conflict such as “The Conflict over the Gaza Strip” and “Refugee Camps” (Respondent 4). While others went one step further and suggested that Israel-Palestine news headline dominance had reached the extent to which it had crowded out other stories and topics. Respondent 7, a young graduate, expressed such a view, explaining how it was “Russia-Ukraine but not so much anymore, it’s mainly just Israel-Palestine”. It’s also important to mention that the other stories which peopled mentioned did vary. Including the post office scandal, UK Election and even celebrities like Andrew Tate. However, they all agreed on the relevance of Israel-Palestine. Work by Garfias (2024) has determined that it is the capacity for Citizen Journalism on social media which has led to coverage volume increasing exponentially since October 2023. Now, such platforms have taken on an important role in sharing acts of resistance and up-to-date conflict information (Garfias 2024).

            As mentioned above, discussion with respondents also revealed that issues with coverage of Israel-Palestine on social media were prevalent and being experienced often by audience members. This further solidified the relevance of this topic and importance of this study. When asked what issues they had experienced with coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict on social media, only two respondents were not able to give specific answers. The first of these, Respondent 8, was unable to remember specific issues but stated that “there has been, but I’ve often dismissed and moved on”. Whilst the second respondent unable to reference specific issues, Respondent 11, explained how this was due to the fact they had “distanced myself from online news”. This left ten of the twelve respondents or roughly 85% who were able to recall specific issues they had experienced with social media coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Responses varied with exposure to graphic content and issues with controversial or bias reporting (framing) being the most common. Respondent 2 felt they had been particularly impacted by issues relating to the framing of coverage, sharing that their experience often featured “very divisive content totally politicised “and that it was “hard to find a middle ground”. Fake News and hateful comment sections, the later falling under the category of audience conflict, were also listed as being experienced in relation to coverage. Respondent 7 explained how comments surrounding Israel-Palestine on social media often ended in “racism and antisemitism”. Of further significance is the fact that among these respondents 50% of them reported experiencing two or more issues when consuming coverage on social media. Highlighting how there is a clear abundance of issues with news content of Israel-Palestine posted to social media and that in attempting to consume such coverage, audiences are exposing themselves not to single or isolated issues but potentially multiple, different issues.

            The findings from this section of the interview process have shown that the issues discussed throughout this study are regularly being experienced by social media audiences, again solidifying the relevance of this topic. They also show the need for this study to further knowledge and understanding, to aid the developments of solutions to the issues of disinformation, Cyberbalkanzation and more. Immediately following the October the 7^th attacks, these issues also gained attention in the mainstream media. Both reporting in the month of October, the New Humanitarian and the Washington Post attempted to shed light on social media’s faults when covering Israel-Palestine. Reporting by The New Humanitarian echoed concerns towards bias and unfair reporting mentioned by interviewees such as Respondent 2. Their article, published on the 23^rd of October, discussed how coverage on Social Media is rife with double standards (New Humanitarian 2024). One particular example of this is how casualties are described by media organisations. Seen across social media, reporting of the conflict often refers to Israeli casualties as being ‘killed’ whilst Palestinians as having ‘died’. This clear framing of the news to fit a certain narrative is common on social media and mainstream news broadcasts, sky news recently found themselves under fire for the use of such tactics live on air (YouTube 2024). Whilst The Washington Post, reporting on the 10^{th of} October, just several days after the conflict reignited, expressed concerns about graphic content on social media, reporting that “social media has been flooded with videos of violence” (Lorenzo 2023).

            Finally, the relevance of this topic is only compounded when considering the lack of audience awareness of the issues present on social media. Although the majority of respondents reported experiencing issues, discussions suggested that they did not feel aware of these issues when consuming news on social media. This implies they would be less likely to notice, deal with and alert others to such problems. To assess audience awareness this question was posed to them:

Question 15) Please Select the Issues you feel conscious of when consuming news on social media-

1. Disinformation (Fake News)          B) Framing                C) Cyberbalkanization                                           D) Graphic Content                E) Audience Conflict

Of those interviewed zero responded that they felt conscious of all five issues. On average participants only selected a variety of three issues with disinformation and graphic content being the most commonly selected. Cyberbalkanization was only selected by one respondent. These findings are worrying and suggest that overall audience awareness is low. Basing our analysis on the average response of audiences feeling conscious of three issues, we could determine that 40% of the issues this study considers aren’t even being considered as a potential problem or something which audiences are looking out for when consuming news on social media. This shows just how big the problem is before we even begin to consider noticing and dealing with the above-mentioned issues. This again shows how relevant and necessary this study is.

4.2.2 Variations in Social Media News Consumption Habits

The first question was on how people found and consumed news on social media. Responses highlighted variations in which platforms individuals chose when consuming coverage of Israel-Palestine. A wide variety of social networking platforms were mentioned from YouTube and Facebook to X (Twitter) and Podcast forums. The ways in which people chose to use these sites while seeking news coverage also greatly varied. It became clear respondents have developed their own perceptions as to what news coverage existed on certain platforms, influencing the way they use sites, or even potentially avoid them. For example, Respondent 4 mentioned how Instagram news was mainly “users pushing Citizen Journalism” while Respondent 6 explained how they only feel inclined to check X (Twitter) for news “If notified by a news app”. These variations show how individuals are adapting to consuming news on social media and attempting to control the ways in which such platforms present coverage to them. In line with this idea of control, I was surprised to hear that a large proportion of audience members frequenting Instagram felt they were often consuming news involuntarily. Of the ten respondents who mentioned using Instagram to consume news, four of these mentioned how news presented to them was often involuntary, having planned to use the app for entertainment purposes.

            Interviews also highlighted variations in time spent on social media daily. Answers varied from “less than one hour” (Respondent 2) up to “between four and 6 hours” (Respondent 5). The biggest determinant in social media usage was age. Those in the age categories of Late working population (39-64) and Elderly (65 and older) stated they used social media for between less than one and up to two hours daily. In contrast those in the Early working population (18-38) used social media between one and six hours daily, at an average of around three hours. This means that those in youngest age category spent around twice as long on social media as any other age group. With these individuals making up around 60% of the population on social media (Statista 2024), we can determine that the issues discussed are most likely to affect young people. Recent work by Fred Selnes shares these concerns. While assessing the potential damage of Fake News on social media he notes that social media platforms make up a significant or majority of younger individuals news repertoire, making them increasingly vulnerable to misinformation at a disproportionate level when compared to other age groups (Selnes 2023). These issues are only exacerbated when we consider how these young people are also increasingly likely to share fake and unverified news across their social platforms and among circles of other young individuals (National Literacy Trust 2022). These variations in social media usage, dependent on age, shown by this study, mirror that of the work done by researchers at the Pew Research Centre. This work, conducted in 2021, determined that 83% of those aged 18-49 had used social media before, whilst in comparison only 45% of individuals aged over 65 reported doing so (Auxier and Anderson 2021).

            Finally, in consideration of how individuals are consuming news on social media, participants were also asked if there were any online alternatives to social media on which they consumed news content. In contrast to social media consumption, answers here were limited in terms of both content and variety. Four respondents stated that they had no alternatives. Of the remaining eight, all eight mentioned the BBC news app as an alternative. This lacking variation in alternatives is worrying as it places significant reliance on certain organisations to uphold reporting standards, reliability and neutrality.

            Notably, when posed the question as to what online alternatives individuals were using to consume news on social media, there was clear hesitation in responses. It became clear that most did not have a reliable or frequent alternative to social media, with answers including “I use the BBC news feed occasionally” (Respondent 2) and participants explaining they “only really check notifications” (Respondent 12) on alternative apps. This arguably may be due to the fact the Social Media leaves individuals feeling informed enough, with Respondent 6 explaining how they “feel caught up from social media”. Whatever the case, this overreliance on social media is undeniably an issue. This is due to a plethora of reasons, notably work by Antino and Moravec has highlighted how fake news is harder to identify on social media due to user’s mindset on these platforms, all accessible posting and algorithms increasing potential confirmation bias (Antino and Moravec 2019). Work by Dennis and Kim into news content on social media echoes these concerns and “found confirmation bias to be rampant” (Kim and Dennis 2019, p.1025), while Tom Clucas has discussed how social media is rife with “examples of online vitriol” (Clucas 2020, p.48). This reliance on social networking sites for news consumption may, however, improve confidence in both government official and official holders. Johnson (2014) has argued that social media’s ability to connect users directly to those in power has greatly improved trust and confidence in officials (Johnson 2014).

            But what does all this mean for Israel-Palestine news coverage on social media? As mentioned previously Israel-Palestine has dominated news discourse. These findings additionally show that audiences are consuming such coverage in a variety of ways, on various platforms and often involuntarily. This also means the issues within such coverage posted to social media are diverse, cover a variety of outlets and platforms and , because alternatives to social media appear limited, are more impactful than initially thought.

4.3 Dealing with Disinformation

4.3.1 Notions of Trust

A clear theme resulting from discussion into the consumption of Israel-Palestine news coverage on social media was how individuals’ perceptions and trust in such coverage was influenced, established and varied. Interviewees were asked to describe their level of trust in news content on social media and as a follow up question, where necessary, asked to reveal what had influenced their conclusions. Responses highlighted an overwhelming level of scepticism and distrust towards content posted to social media. No answers featured positive language, and no individual was able to determine having anything greater than a minimal level of trust in this content. Common responses used language such as “little” (Respondents 1 and 2), “low” (Respondent 4), “very low” (Respondent 8) and “no trust” (Respondents 5 and 7). From an entirely one perspective this limited trust could be beneficial as it would increase scepticism and theoretically make audiences better at detecting issues such as Fake News and Framing. Such increased scepticism was lacking throughout the 2020 covid pandemic, resulting in those consuming news on social media being exposed and accepting a high volume of false conspiracy theories, relating to pandemic rules and regulation (Giansiaracusa 2021). However, when considering this distrust in the light of Israel-Palestine coverage, it may reduce the reach of important information about the conflict and reduce the sharing of influential citizen journalism videos which offer important perspective and insight into the fighting on both sides. This sort of coverage requires trust to be present for it to be shared across platforms and raise awareness for those suffering due to this ongoing conflict.

            Distrust in social media news content is not a new phenomenon. Work by Ozuru and Ekeanyanwu from 2013 reported that the credibility of social media networks as news sources was starting to be “increasingly questioned” (Ozuru and Ekeanyanwu 2013, p.86). But what is it that influences these levels of trust?

            When beginning the interview respondents were presented several examples. The first of which, Example 1 (See appendix), detailed a particularly shocking news report posted to X (Twitter) which falsely detailed the discovery of Hamas forces, operating just outside Gaza, as having beheaded multitudes of babies. In an attempt to uncover what influences trust in such sources participants were then asked- Do you trust this source? Responses highlighted the need for recognisable news sources or organisations as a significant determinant in the level of trust granted to such stories. Answers included “I haven’t heard this source and so struggle to trust it” (Respondent 1), “No, I’ve not heard of i24 News” (Respondent 4), “No, I don’t recognise the source or journalist” (Respondent 6). Further, we can determine it also matters which platform coverage of Israel-Palestine is posted on, with Respondent 5 stating “No, I don’t trust twitter” and Respondent 7 mentioning that they are “aware X is unmediated”. Finally, how audiences are already perceiving content posted to social media in relation to Israel-Palestine impacts their trust of new and ongoing coverage. This was highlighted by Respondent 7 who explained they lacked trust because they are “aware of shock culture aiming to gain clicks” and Respondent 10 who believed the article “seems sensationalised”. Thus, we can see that individuals trust in social media news coverage of Israel-Palestine is influenced by their familiarity with the source, trust in the particular platform being used and their preconceived notions of similar content.

            Closely related to the topic of trust in social media coverage of Israel-Palestine, is the issue of disinformation or fake news. Understanding audience experience and awareness of the issue in relation to Israel-Palestine coverage is a vital component of this study. In an attempt to assess this, participants were asked how big of a problem they believed disinformation on social media to be. Unsurprisingly, answers mirrored that of the previously discussed Question 6- Describe your level of trust in news content presented on social media. All twelve respondents used negative language and saw disinformation as either a “Big” (Respondents 1,2,3,4,9,10 and 11), “Large” (Respondent 8), “Bad” (Respondent 5) or “Massive” (Respondents 7 and 12) problem.  Several participants also expressed concerns relating to disinformation and its impact on democracy. With Respondent 1 explaining “democracy won’t work when people are not accurately informed”, with others following suit “People can’t be democratic if not informed” (Respondent 2) and “democracy (is) particularly vulnerable due to the divisive nature of this” (Respondent 7). Therefore, we can see disinformation as being an issue which audience members are unanimously aware of, perceive as a big or major problem and in several cases, are additionally aware of the potential long-term consequences. These concerns have been echoed in academic writing with work by both Shu (2020) and Wang (2020) detailing how fake news can impact audiences’ confidence in the news ecosystem and in doing so change individuals’ ability to separate the real from the fake (Shu and Wang 2020).

            In an attempt to bring this topic to focus specifically on Israel-Palestine coverage, audiences were asked to recall any stories, headlines or articles posted about the conflict on social media, which they considered to be disinformation. In contrast to Question 6 responses were markedly limited. Of those questioned only four of the twelve were able to recall particular stories (See Appendix). On the surface, this would not appear to be a problem and actually suggests that audiences aren’t being exposed to fake news in relation to the conflict. However, once we bring into consideration the responses to aforementioned Question 6 and Question 12, concerns quickly arise. Similar to Question 6, Question 12 asked individuals how much of the content they see on social media did they perceive as being disinformation. Answers showed a clear consensus towards respondents perceiving the “majority” (6 respondents gave this response) of content to be disinformation. Responses reached levels as high as “70% of the content” (Respondent 11) and “All news” (Respondent 7). Thus, both these questions (6 and 12) suggest that audience members perceive disinformation to be a significant problem and something which is in abundance across social media. Now considering how a very limited number of these individuals were actually able to recall examples of Israel-Palestine disinformation, we are led to believe that this is not because they aren’t being exposed to them, but because individuals aren’t able to recognise and remember such stories. What initially may have appeared as a positive, through further investigation and analysis, is actually a significant and evidently troubling issue. Israel-Palestine coverage in particular has been rife with issues of disinformation. Facilitated by social medias ability to post and share instantaneously incorrect or fake reporting on this conflict “has flourished on twitter, TikTok, Facebook and other social media sites” (Frenkle 2021). 

4.3.2 Handling Disinformation

            Finally on the topic of trust, this study also attempted to uncover what steps audiences take when trust is lacking in relation to social media coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Previous discussion has revealed that audiences trust in the content on social media is low, with the majority of content perceived as disinformation. In an attempt to uncover what steps audiences take to assesses coverage, several examples were presented to them. Example 1, a post from the social Media site X (Twitter), is a well-documented fake news headline from the conflict. Around the outbreak of renewed fighting, several outlets across social platforms reported that Hamas had beheaded up to forty Israeli Babies in an unprecedented and horrifying attack. This story made its way to the top with President Biden referencing it in a White House address. The story was soon declared as completely unverified, and corrections had to be made across media organisations (Cheurfi 2023).

            By no means as a way to trick respondents into accepting fake news, but as a means of nudging individuals to naturally discuss how they would attempt to verify sources, audiences were then asked, what steps, if any, they would take to verify the headline presented in Example 1. Worryingly, 6 individuals, so half of those interviewed, stated that they would not attempt to verify this source. For some this was due to “accepting info on face value” (Respondent 6), whilst others confessed, they would rather “delete and move on” (Respondent 2). These failures to verify are clearly an issue. When considering the variation of reasons behind why people aren’t verifying news sources, we can argue that this is due to both assumed levels of trust but also equally, distrust. When audiences trust the news they consume on social media they are likely to accept it at “face value”. However, when audiences presume a distrust, they are also disregarding attempts to verify. This may be due to the feeling that they “Don’t have the time needed to fully verify” (Respondent 1) or because they “believe ignorance is bliss” (Respondent 7). These variations of trust, moving in both directions, are equally problematic. They are impacting audiences’ motivation to verify sources. In doing so, increasing their vulnerability to disinformation and leaving potentially harmful coverage unchecked. In relation to the Israel-Palestine conflict, which as mentioned is rife with disinformation, these varying levels of trust are likely to mean stories of falsehoods (such as Example 1) are likely to spread rapidly and easy across social networks.

4.4 Engaging with the News

4.4.1. Potential for Cyberbalkanization

Analysis of discussion resulting from interviews shows high levels of potential for Cyberbalkanization. This online ideological isolation has wide reaching implications, including the idea that individuals would only ever see or interact with content in line with their own values, removing exposure to opposing views and making social platforms devoid of any cross-ideology collaboration or incorporation (Cass 2008).

            In order to reduce the risk of Cyberbalkanization audiences need to be actively seeking opposing views. To assess the rate at which this was occurring among interview participants the following question was asked:

Q17) How often do you encounter views or representations of news coverage on social media that you disagree with?

Responses for this were encouraging, with just over the majority of participants expressing that they saw such content regularly. Certain individuals actually felt that such content made up the majority of their newsfeeds. Respondent 3 explained how they “often disagree with news content” while Respondent 6 felt as though they encountered opposing views “everyday”. These responses shown that audience members are regularly being presented with content featuring opposing views. However, if we are to totally contain the risk of Cyberbalkanization, audience behaviours need to be geared towards actively seeking out and being exposed to a diverse set of viewpoints surrounding news coverage. Only one respondent stated that they were actively seeking this content.

It should also be mentioned that audiences’ behaviours in relation to the opposing viewpoints they encounter on social media can actually work against us in reducing the potential for cyberbalkanization. When explaining how they occasionally see opposing views, Respondent 8 went on to detail how they then “often block” those posting these views, as regularly as “two times a week”. On the surface, this act of blocking could have potential upsides because of reducing exposure to politicised content which often creates fragmented, nonsensical and enraged discussion (Papacharissi 2002). However, this potential upside is greatly outweighed by such behaviours leading to an increase in ideological isolation. As detailed by Zhu’s 2024 work into disconnective practices on social media, these behaviours are a way for individuals to “avoid challenging views, dissociate with disagreeable others and retreat into emotional safe spaces” (Zhu 2024, p.135)

Further worrying evidence for the potential growth in cyberbalkanization can be found when considering how the majority of interview participants chose to primarily interact with content that aligned with their own views. When questioned as to whether they interact more with content that aligns with their own political, ideological and social values, a disproportionate number admitted that they did. In some instances, respondents even stated that they found it “frustrating otherwise” (Respondent 4) and that they “almost exclusively” (Respondent 8) interacted with content aligning with their own views. These behaviours greatly increase the potential for cyberbalkanization. Further, with only 2 respondents saying that they did actively seek out opposing news views on social media, we can determine that the majority of audiences aren’t doing enough to reduce their own personal potential for cyberbalkanization.

Overall, although encouraging that audiences’ members are to some extent being exposed to content they disagree with, this may not be enough to prevent cyberbalkanization as social media networking sites preference-based algorithms, fuelled by consistent interactions with certain pages and individuals, push users closer towards ideological isolation. In relation to Israel-Palestine this is likely to see users only consume and interact with content that they personally side with. For instance, those who are strongly Pro-Palestine would not be exposed to views surrounding Israel’s military operation and demands for hostage returns (Times of Israel 2024). Whilst on the flip side, those who are Pro-Israel will not see coverage relating to the extreme suffering and atrocities inflicted on Palestinians and subsequent demands for a ceasefire (Al Jazeera 2024). This will inevitably create an increasingly divided and extremist news ecosystem on social media, in which confirmation bias and disinformation are prevalent. Collaboration and incorporation of multiple ideologies into audiences’ news feeds will be greatly reduced and potentially non-existent.

4.4.2 Acts of Engagement

Of clear importance when considering social media news consumption, in particular with a topic as divisive and evolving as Israel-Palestine, is how audience members are actively choosing to engage with sources. Analysis of interview participants responses in relation to engagement show that online audiences are engaging emotionally with Israel-Palestine coverage on social media. But, conversely aren’t engaging in debate and discussion surrounding the same sources or taking action to bring about change.

            Example 1, irrelevant of validity, unanimously triggered negative emotions among respondents. All of those interviewed expressed feelings of sadness, discontent and upset upon being presented with this source. Respondent 10 expressed how similar news articles often make them feel “Terrible”, while Respondent 5 implied that the negative emotions surrounding content was not uncommon stating that it was the “unfortunate reality of the news we do see today”. These responses show the extent to which coverage can impact audience members emotions. Highlighting how individuals consuming news of the Israel-Palestine conflict on social media are engaged emotionally. The extent of this engagement can be significant, consistent and negatively impact individuals’ worldviews. Examples of this include Respondent 8 who stated that coverage made them believe in “constant wars but a lack of chance for peace”, while Respondent 1 expressed their belief that coverage heavily featured “the death of innocents and the horrors of war”. To further establish this point, interviewees were also subsequently asked if the news content they see on social media impacts their actions and emotions. Overall consensus of responses here was similar to that of questioning relating to Example 1. Audience members felt that coverage of Israel-Palestine on social media often triggered negative emotions. In terms of conflict specifics, respondents mentioned “violence towards children” (Respondent 3) and how “content on Gaza (is) especially shocking and horrific” (Respondent 5). Highlighting how audiences’ emotional engagement in Israel-Palestine coverage on social media is negatively impacting emotions and potentially, “mental health” (Respondent 12). However, in contrast to this intense and impactful emotional engagement brought about by social media coverage, no respondent mentioned an impact on their actions. This disparity is worrying and suggests that coverage can induce an imbalance between emotional impact and individuals’ propensity to act, either to change how they feel or alter the coverage they are seeing. This could be through acts of protests or attempts to find alternative news sources and coverage.

            In addition to this disparity in terms of emotional engagement and action, is a clear lack in audience attempts to engage with discussion relating to Israel-Palestine news sources on social media. Although previous discussion has highlighted audiences are emotionally engaged with content, often resulting in negative emotions, these same individuals aren’t actively engaging with content. When asked if they had ever engaged in debate or discussion online, relating to Israel-Palestine news coverage on social media, only two of the twelve interviewed stated they had. In fact, responses suggested that audiences are widely opposed to engaging with news sources in such a way. Respondent 4 explained how they “feel it’s weird to engage” in debate while several others explained how they preferred to “often view debate but never engage” (Respondent 12). This imbalance suggests that audiences are unfairly positioned in relation to social media coverage. Here, their emotions are easily influenced by such coverage but attempts to act towards shaping or even improving understanding of such content is greatly limited. This places too much power in the hands of those producing and sharing content. While shifting the potential damage of false, graphic and upsetting coverage entirely onto audience members attempting to consume news coverage of Israel-Palestine on social media. This lack of action also increases audiences’ susceptibility to disinformation, framing and cyberbalkanization. The problem is only exacerbated when we consider the recent study by Horner and Galletta (2022) into emotions and fake news on social media. This work determined that individuals who are emotionally reactive in relation to social media news were more likely to spread fake news among their following and social group (Horner and Galletta 2022). Further, their disproportionate emotional engagement makes graphic content and audience conflict that much more damaging, frequently inducing negative emotions.

            This clear disparity in audiences’ emotional engagement and action thus shows further issues present with social media news coverage of Israel-Palestine. However, although action in relation to emotion is clearly lacking, interviews did reveal, in certain cases, that audiences are taking steps to establish their own authority over social media news coverage of Israel-Palestine.

4.5 Longstanding Impacts of Coverage

4.5.1 Individual’s Authority over Social Media News

Individuals’ social media news consumption habits, particularly how they are choosing to consume news, was central during several sections of interview questioning. This uncovered how several audience members are opting to take a path of ‘news avoidance’. That is attempting to remove all news coverage from their social media feeds. This can be seen as a way to avoid potential issues with such coverage, reduce emotional harm and remove themselves from a potential cycle of distressing and overwhelming content present on social media in relation to Israel-Palestine. When asked if they take any steps to verify sources of Israel-Palestine news on social media, 7 respondents referenced news avoidance tactics. This often involved taking steps such as “removing (coverage) from my feed” (Respondent 5) or opting to be “dismissing and moving on” (Respondent 10). Thus, when considering what authority individuals are taking over the news content present on social media, we can determine that this is limited, passive and focused on withdrawal from the news cycle. Again, this is worrying and suggests that the issues present with coverage of Israel-Palestine on social media may result in a less informed and potentially isolated news audience. To tackle these issues audience members need to be active, wanting to engage and attempting to shape the quality and content of coverage. So, what about the participants who said they were taking steps to verify sources?

            Of those who claimed to be verifying sources of Israel-Palestine news coverage on social media, four of the five mentioned the idea of verifying sources by cross-referencing stories on either the BBC website or Google Search. Although still limited, and placing heavy reliance on legacy media organisations to present truthful articles while remaining unbiased, this is more encouraging as it shows audience members taking active steps to confirm the validity of Israel-Palestine news coverage. The final respondent stated that they believed “social media will help with determining fake news” (Respondent 6). They went on to explain how this can be done by checking comments, profiles of those posting coverage and staying sufficiently up-to-date with the news cycle on social media. Such tactics can be effective, with account credibility often able to be determined quickly through their online presence, interactions and following. With fake news often spread by non-human accounts such activity can often quickly be recognised, with users’ ability to comment additionally being utilised to spread awareness (Shu and Wang 2020).

            Having determined that the majority of those interviewed were not actively taking steps to verify sources, I was eager to establish any reasoning behind this inaction. Questioning revealed lacking audience confidence in their ability to tackle issues as the leading cause. When asked if they felt well equipped to handle disinformation on social media (Question 13), only half of those interviewed stated that they did. Of those confessing that they did not, answers included reasoning such as the idea that “it’s hard to verify anything online” (Respondent 7), or feelings that “I’m gullible online and find it hard to determine what’s real” (Respondent 8). There was a notable pattern here in terms of age and those stating their felt equipped to handle disinformation. Of answering yes to Question 13, 5 of the 6 respondents were aged between 18-39. Three of these individuals cited recent degree qualifications and a subsequent confidence in their ability to thinking critically and check facts. This, therefore, additionally highlights variations across age groups, in relation to confidence in individuals’ ability to assess and deal with disinformation.

4.5.2 Compassion fatigue

Interviews revealed a significant amount of audience members had been regularly exposed to graphic content when viewing news coverage of Israel-Palestine on social media. In response to Question 14:

Q14) Have you ever involuntarily been exposed to graphic content on social media when viewing coverage of the Israel-Palestine Conflict?

1. If yes how often? Can you detail your experience?

Ten of the twelve audience members questioned expressed that they had been exposed to graphic content, on multiple occasions before. Of the two respondents to not answer yes, one explained how they had seen such content but only due to being “shown by peers” (Respondent 9) while the other explained how they had avoided such coverage by having “purposely stayed clear” (Respondent 11). The rate and regularity of exposure was particularly shocking with interviewees experiencing such content on a daily basis. Respondent 3 felt that their exposure was particularly regular stating that it was “every time when on Instagram”. Thus, responses show an overwhelming majority of audiences members are regularly being exposed to graphic content when attempting to consume news coverage of Israel-Palestine on social media. In this context graphic content often includes scenes of violence, bloodshed and injury. Such imagery can significantly impact individuals’ emotions and willingness to engage with news coverage on social media. To uncover further details as to what graphic content in relation to Israel-Palestine on social media involved, respondents were asked where possible to provide extra details of their experience. As expected, coverage of Israel-Palestine featured graphic content including “graphic and bloody scenes” (Respondent 4), “videos of bombings, dead civilians” (Respondent 7) and even “a group of Palestinians holding up a baby without a head” (Respondent 8). These findings therefore show that news content of the Israel-Palestine conflict present on social media is regularly exposing individuals to graphic content. Such content has become normalised on social media and in some cases is even considered a form of entertainment (Nicklin and Swain 2020), although it is clearly highly problematic.

            This exposure to graphic content does of course raise concerns of emotional damage. But, with exposure being so regular and consistent, there is an equal risk of compassion fatigue. The idea of compassion fatigue has gained particular attention recently due to an ever increasingly brutal daily news cycle. Such coverage drains our reserves of sympathy. In such cases the more suffering we see, the less we care (Robinson 2024). In terms of Israel-Palestine news coverage on social media we can see clear evidence for potential compassion fatigue. As continued exposure to scenes of death and violence, reported by participants, reduces audience members compassion and concern for those involved in the conflicted. Work by Kyriakidou (2014) into Distant Suffering has highlighted how lacking proximity from the conflicts being witnessed can increase compassion fatigue. Seen during the reporting of 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami, audiences lacking proximity to events but close access to coverage created a situation where “the object of concern is not the suffering itself but its implications for the viewer” (Kyriakidou 2014, p.227). Coverage of Israel-Palestine features the same issues with proximity and so is highly susceptible to the same problem. Wherein audience members become detached emotionally from images of suffering and its victims. In addition to lacking proximity, repetitive exposure to graphic conflict can also encourage compassion fatigue. Such crisis reporting often falls into formulaic coverage, with audiences often expecting to see scenes of suffering and violence, being made to “feel that we really have seen this story before” (Moeller 1994). Again, this repetitive reporting of suffering can be seen throughout Israel-Palestine coverage on social media. Highlighted by respondents expressing how they regularly see graphic content. Such as Respondent 7 who detailed seeing graphic content “nearly every time I’m checking twitter”. So, overall, we can see that due to both lacking proximity and formulaic, repetitive coverage reporting, individuals consuming news coverage of Israel-Palestine on social media are highly likely to suffer from compassion fatigue. In turn leading to reduced empathy for those suffering the atrocities of this conflict. Audience attention in many cases is switching to considering how they can prevent witnessing such suffering and, in some cases, avoid consuming coverage entirely.

4.5.3 Next Steps

The final section of interview questioning focused on assessing participants opinions on who they believe should monitor the news coverage of Israel-Palestine on Social Media and, what should be done next to tackle issues with coverage. Interviewees were first asked if they believed that social media platforms should be taking more steps to discuss any issues previously mentioned during their interviews. This was one of the most divisive questions among respondents. Responses featured no clear majority or pattern, with individuals’ opinions clearly divided on who’s responsible. Answers ranged between those clearly believing the platforms themselves to be responsible, “yes they hold 100% of the responsibility” (Respondent 1), to those who strongly believed otherwise “no, this is a government issue, privately owned companies can’t be held responsible” (Respondent 2). Now, I am also not here to make a value judgement as to who’s to blame and made sure to keep any bias or personal opinions out of questioning. But I will say that on the topic of responsibility it is incredibly hard to place this on any one group or individual platform. This is a complex issue with serious concerns surrounding freedom of speech, five respondents mentioned such concerns relating to individuals having the right to post and share what they desire on social media. This of course makes any sort of censorship on behalf of social media platforms incredibly difficult. What’s most important about this line of questioning is the lack of unity of individuals’ opinions as to who is responsible. Additionally, no respondents mentioned any ideas relating to audiences’ own responsibility in educating themselves and others on the potential issue. These audience members should also be working to self-verify sources present on social media, while aiming to regulate their use of social media platforms and increase the variety of source types in their personal news cycles.

            An important potential solution for issues surrounding news sources on social media is source ratings. These source ratings would present news sources with rankings to determine where they originated, the accuracy of the information presented and who this has been verified by. Source ratings are a relatively new concept, and it came as no surprise to find that a minimal number of respondents had heard of them before. However, upon explanation, support for the potential solution was high. The general consensus was that this would be an effective way to verify news sources and hold individuals and organisations accountable for the content they release. In terms of Israel-Palestine content on social media, such practices could see fake news sources flagged, and coverage highlighted for potential framing.  In doing so this would put the power back into the hands of audiences, prompting them to question news sources and in some cases, dismiss falsehoods. It can sometimes just be this encouragement, to think about source origins, that protects audience members from believing, engaging, and sharing fake news (Kim and Dennis 2019). However, source ratings are not without their flaws. They would need to be implemented in a way which did not disrupt the news cycle, can be universally understood and devoid of any bias.

5-Conclusion

This study set out to establish how social media news coverage of Israel-Palestine has impacted audiences’ understandings of the topic. It has shown that the volume and content of coverage on social media has left audiences feeling overwhelmed. In some cases, such coverage has dominated news feeds on social media, taking up the majority of users interactions. The content of this has centred around violent, distressing, upsetting and often graphic material. As a result, the majority of these audiences’ members now view this conflict, and the coverage they see of it on social media, as an ongoing source of digitalised bloodshed and persistent suffering. All audience members, regardless of their moral standings and affiliations, risk harm as this social media coverage influences and distorts conflict understandings. The prolonged exposure to graphic imagery and war journalism framing draws discussion and interest away from deeper understandings of conflict suffering, scale and ideology. Further, this study has also shown that in part these understandings are shaped by social media usage habits. Notably, the majority have limited alternatives to coverage present on social media. Those who do, rely heavily on legacy media organisations which existing literature has shown to present bias in their coverage. Whilst some have simply decided to take up a strategy of news avoidance to cope with the issues. The decision to follow an approach of individual interviews, along with the question choices, proved effective in establishing how audiences are dealing with certain issues present in coverage. In particular, audiences are highly aware and responsive to the idea of disinformation. However, these same individuals’ ability to recall and recognise such problematic false coverage is limited.

 I think particular attention should also be granted into the assessment of Cyberbalkanization discussed in this study. Research here has clearly shown a high potential for this phenomenon of ideological isolation in relation to social media coverage of the conflict. This sees audience members only viewing and interacting with content and framing of news which aligns with their own biases. This is only worsened by a combination of the algorithms present on social media and individuals own actions in fuelling an echo chamber like environment surrounding coverage. Analysis of interviewees responses also showed a significant lack of awareness towards cyberbalkanization with an almost total majority of participants having never heard of this issue. This is only worsened by the fact that responses suggested limited evidence of these same audience members actively working to prevent themselves becoming isolated or further their knowledge of views opposing their own. In consideration of how audiences are now choosing to engage with coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict on social media, this study has shown that audience members are making minimal attempts to engage with news sources and debate surrounding them. They are also making limited attempts to shape the coverage they are viewing or seek alternative coverage. As discussed, this is a clear issue when considering exposure to diverse sources and opinion, but is only exacerbated when we additionally consider how the same audience members are negatively emotionally affected by such coverage. Consistent exposure to coverage framed from a war-journalism perspective, containing graphic and violent imagery can reduce individuals’ propensity to sympathise with sufferings whilst also feeling personally distressed and negative towards their own worldview. More often than not this can leave those who choose to consume the majority of their news on social media becoming less informed and even isolated in terms of their views and opinions of conflict coverage.  I would like to reiterate the advice I mentioned earlier- that to best deal with such issues in an everchanging environment, audience members need to be active, persistent and calculated in their attempts to shape the quality and content of coverage.

            In relation to how the work in this study connects to the existing body of scholarly literature on this topic; firstly, ideas discussed surrounding disinformation and framing tie in closely with those previously discussed in relation to traditional media and legacy news organisation. Research has shown that coverage offered on social media contains the same level of bias and falsifications, and in some cases is even more prevalent on such sites. I have actually shown that on the whole, social media goes one step further in terms of volume, complexity in deciphering or recognising disinformation, and limited audience ability to filter out such news coverage than previous writing on other news mediums has suggested. Secondly, my findings align with current understandings around the power of social media and the news coverage on such sites and in particular how coverage can highlight or dismiss certain narratives. In doing so, coverage is influencing global perceptions of the conflict, changing level of support, altering narratives and in some cases influencing conflict events. Finally, in terms of existing literature, my assessment of the graphic content in social media coverage and the potential harm involved with consumption, has drawn heavily on current understandings of compassion fatigue. Showing how this excessive volume of conflict reporting, containing violent and bloody scenes, framed in a way which prioritises reporting’s of sufferings can greatly affect audiences’ capacity for empathy. This in turn pushes us towards a society which struggles to comprehend the feelings and needs of others, but also offers limited support to those in need while not actively opposing those inflicting harm.

            On reflection, I believe this work has shown a clear need for further research into the issues mention. Particularly that of Cyberbalkanization and the potential for compassion fatigue due to the levels of graphic content in coverage on social media. I would like to see more time and resources dedicated to analysis and discussion of these issues.    I believe my study was limited in that all respondents were residents of the United Kingdom and had been for at least the last 10 years. This meant that it lacked a global perspective, and I think expanding this study to incorporate residents of other nations would be beneficial in furthering understandings, notably that of the extent of the issues discussed and if audience location plays a role in their severity. Further, I think it is important to note for future studies that open discussions surrounding the topic of Israel-Palestine with audience members was not without its difficulties. Firstly, I believed it to be imperative to keep my own views out of discussion. With something that has become such a politicised and divisive topic we are all prone to forming our own personal opinions. But these opinions should in no way be presented to respondents either through direct discussion, question choices or the framing of debate. Of course, doing so risks influencing responses and the integrity of results. Along these lines, the nature of the Israel-Palestine topic also impacted respondents’ willingness to enter into discussion. There was a clear apprehension expressing views surrounding the conflict. Interviews were also anonymised in an attempt to reduce some apprehension; however, it still played a role in shaping their freedom of expression and enthusiasm for open discussion. I think the divisive nature of this topic and fragility around its discussion demonstrates a further need for analysis and research into its coverage.